The financial cris is motivated thinking about interaction between financial and monetary stability policies. These policies are more interrelated than previously thought. The purpose develops an analytical framework that analyzes these interactions. We use an overlapping-generations model in which an aggregate financial risk is endogenous. It embeds negative externalities in the perceived risk, and integrates banking into our DSGE model. The results include (i) monetary policy's effectiveness is affected by financial stability policy; (ii) institutional constraints on central bank's lending affect the operation of monetary policy transmission mechanism; (iii) policy makers will conceivably face tradeoffs between price stability and financial stability.
I. Introduction
The recent financial crisis poses challenges for academics and policy makers about monetary policy and motivated thinking about the interconnection between financial stability and monetary policy (Adrian and Shin, 2008) .
According to the conventional view up to the crisis "there is no general tradeoff between monetary and financial stability" (Issing, 2003) 1 . This view also led to the argument that conducting monetary policy and the regulation and supervision of banks and capital markets under one roof creates a potential for a conflict of interest.
Before the recent crisis it was natural to view the basic tool of monetary policy -the key monetary policy rate (he nceforth KPR) as orthogonal to the regulatory financial stability tools such as liquidity and bank capital requirements. Therefore, in some countries like the UK, the responsibility for safeguarding financial stability was assigned to special institutions such as the FSA (separated from the Bank of England).
The recent crisis, however, vividly demonstrated that a financial crisis can occur even after a relatively long period of world-wide low inflation and even where the task of financial stability is separated from the central bank (henceforth CB) and assigned to a special institution. It seems, therefore, that the trend towards separation of the two functions may have to be reexamined.
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In fact the crisis has caused many to begin to pay closer attention to the interaction and the interrelation between the KPR and the regulatory tools aimed at safeguarding financial stability, and to rethink the wisdom of the institutional separation of monetary policy and financial stability. Together monetary policy and 1 Likewise it was argued that a central bank "that was able to maintain price stability would also incidentally minimize the need for lender-of-last-resort" intervention (Schwartz, 1998) . 2 The UK government announced in June 2010 the restructuring of its regulatory system that will consolidate power within the Bank of England, abolishing the FSA.
financial regulation provide a set of cyclical tools that may be best coordinated under one roof of the CB, see Blanchard et al (2010) . 3 As recently stated succinctly by Paul Volcker (2010) "Monetary policy and concerns about the structure and condition of banks and the financial system more generally are inextricably intertwined". Some economists hold the hypothesis that the long period during which CBs have kept low interest rates, contributed to the eruption of the financial crisis in 2007 4 . At the same time, the disconnection between the KPR and interbank rates during the crisis in many economies, demonstrated the adverse impact that financial instability has on the effectiveness of monetary policy.
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The purpose of this paper is to develop an analytical framework, backed by simulations, where the risk of the financial system is endogenous, the interaction between the CB monetary policy tool and financial stability regulatory tools (such as capital and reserve requirements) are clearly laid out, and whe re possible trade-offs between controlling inflation and safeguarding financial stability can be explicitly examined.
Our analytical framework, which uses an overlapping-generations model, is innovative in three main respects. First, it embeds a negative externality inherent in physical investments. This externality is a result of a wedge between the actual aggregate risks and that seen by the agents. This wedge gives rise to the need for financial stability (macro-prudential) policy making. Second, it integrates financial frictions in the form of b anking financial intermediation into a simple dynamic 3 Chairman Bernanke (2010) argued that "The Federal Reserve's participation in the oversight of banks of all sizes significantly improves its ability to carry out its central banking functions, including making monetary policy, lending through the discount window, and fostering financial stability," 4 For a taxonomy of the various ways in which the risk taking channel operates, see for example Rajan (2005) , Borio and Zhu (2008) and Gamacorta (2009) . For some empirical evidence of the existence of the risk taking channel, see Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró and Saurina, 2009 5 Leijonhufvud (2007) brings Japan up to the end of the 1980's as an example of monetary stability does not guarantee financial stability. He argues that inflation targeting might mislead the CB into pursuing a policy that damages financial stability.
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. Third, it clearly shows how the monetary policy transmission mechanism depends on regulatory and institutional constraints.
We let the CB in our model pursue both price and financial stability. Price stability is defined as achieving inflation target. Financial stability policy aims to contain the systemic risk 6 of the collapse of financial intermediatio n. Systemic risk in our model is the aggregate risk to which the financial system is exposed. Financial stability policy is implemented by (i) Reacting to changes in systemic risk, taking account of the above referred wedge, which is known to the CB. (ii) Preserving the CB's capacity to maintain a credible partial deposit-insurance scheme, where the proportion of deposit insurance is predetermined 7 .
The capacity of the CB to prevent a run on financial intermediaries, is not unlimited however. It depends on two important factors: the size of financial resources it commands, 8 and its lending operations. The CB lending is extended only against safe collaterals which in our model are reserve requirements deposited at the CB. This arrangement of the CB lending to commercial banks plays an important role in the model 9 .
We address explicitly the limits to which CB's can expand their balance sheets in response to financial crisis. Doing so is important because in the 2008 crisis the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, the Bank of England and other CB have 6 It has been observed that banking crises have occurred as a result of aggregate shocks see Gorton, G.(`1988 ) "Banking Panics and Business Cycles" Oxford Economic Papers, 40, The level of this ratio reflects two opposing forces, on the one hand a higher ratio enhances financial stability by reducing the probability of idiosyncratic deposit withdrawals from turning into systemic run on the banks. On the other hand, a higher ratio impairs financial stability by encouraging moral hazard, because banks will extend loans to higher leveraged borrowers. 8 In our model the possibility of the CB to be financed by the government is excluded. Therefore, the capital of the CB relative to the level of bank deposits and loans represents this capacity and is a key variable. 9 One can think of an economy with no government debt and in which all CB lending must be backed by the safest collaterals.
not only expanded their balance sheets on very large scale, but have also, by acquiring non-government obligations (such as commercial paper in the US), exposed themselves to unprecedented levels of credit risk. This risk may impinge adversely on their future operational independence, because it raises the question of legitimacy of these actions and should thus be an integral part of an analysis which considers the interaction between monetary and financial stability 10 (see Buiter, 2009 ).
The main results of the paper are that monetary policy targets and financial stability goals are not orthogonal. Achieving one may require the use of other policy tools to maintain both goals. Furthermore, our model (or models of this type) could guide policymakers in the particular use of diversified tools in order to achieve the policy goals. In addition our model allows the explicit examination of the effects of policy tools on the monetary policy transmission mechanism (including financial stability tools).
The main policy implications are: (1) the effectiveness of monetary policy is affected by capital and reserve requirements (the financial stability tools) as well as by the extent of the partial deposit insurance; (2) Institutional constraints on the ability of banks to obtain funding sources from the CB, such as collateral limitations, strongly affect the way the monetary transmission mechanism operates.
The plan of the paper is as follows: section 2 presents a simple DSGE model, fo llowed by analyses of the equilibrium characteristics of the model (Section 3). In the next section we illustrate these characteristics by using a semi-log linear utility function. Section 5 deals with the interaction of monetary policy and financial 10 For an analysis on the importance of the financial independence of central banks see Cukierman (2006) and Bindsiel, Manzanares, Weller (2005). stability, supported by the model's simulations. Concluding remarks are presented in the last section 6.
The Model
We consider an overlapping-generations model reflecting an economy comprises of households, commercial banks and a central bank (CB). There exists a storable good that in each period can either be consumed or be stored as capital good. In each period t there are markets for consumptio n good, real money balances, commercial bank deposits and loans, capital good, and CB secured loans to banks.
2.a. Households
A new generation of N young people is born in each period t and lives for two periods. 
There is uncertainty about the return on the investment (specified below) and for simplicity we assume that the households are all risk neutral. Formally, the preferences of household j in period t are represented by the following expected utility function based on information at period t
11 In what follows we will omit these subscripts or superscripts unless we deem it necessary to avoid confusion.
Where the function Since the realization of period t physical investment's return takes place at the beginning of period t+1, individuals' choice of period t variables can not be contingent on the realization of ?, that is, c 1t , c 2t , m 1t , m 2t , k t , d t , l t , d t are all noncontingent. Since the choice of some of these variables depends on period t expectations of p t+1 , the latter can not be cont ingent on the realization of ? either. In fact, all of these variables are dependent on a predetermined (exogenous) perceived ?.
On the other hand period t+1 consumption is contingent on the realization of the true
It is useful at this point (before households' budget constraints are presented) to assume that there exists a separating equilibrium for our model economy such that individuals of type 1 use the bank deposits and real money balances in order to smooth their consumption, while individuals of type 2 use the investment in the physical capital and the real money balances for the same purpose. We later on prove that if there exists an equilibrium for our model with banking financial intermediation, it is a separating one.
2.a.1. Households' budget constraints
The households' budget constraints of young and old individuals in periods t and t+1 are specified for depositors, denoted j=1, and for investors, j=2, as follows.
(i) For the young individuals:
where p t is the price of the consumption good in period t.
The state unconditional budget constraints of the old individuals (in expected values terms) are as follows: 
Where q t+1 is period t conditional probability of commercial banks to become insolvent in period t+1. This probability is known and is determined in equilibrium
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(see a detailed analysis below). Banking insolvency entails the activation of the deposit insurance by the central bank, so we let ? (a policy variable) be the share of deposits that is recovered after activating the CB deposits insurance. I is the number of commercial banks 18 .
Note that p t+1 in (3c) and (3d) Each bank makes use in the financial intermediation of its (beginning of period) equity capital, FK t that was accumulated from retained earnings of past periods and it is thus predetermined. Commercial banks are managed by the young individuals in each period. They are motivated to optimize profits since they will enjoy the fruits of their choices (the dividends) when they become old. Banks choose
, of their profits that are to be distributed to their shareholders as dividends. A share (1-d) of their profits will be retained by the intermediaries and will augment the stock of equity capital.
Commercial banks can borrow from the CB a fully secured one-period loan l mt , from the CB lending facility (henceforth, monetary l oan) supplied perfectly elastically at a no minal rate i mt 20 (KPR). Banks can use this borrowing source any way they choose, but the amount borrowed is limited to the amount of collateral they have in the form of total reserves they hold at the CB.
Banks are subject to two additional balance sheet constraints: (i) For financial stability reasons, they must maintain a required capital ratio -expected end-of-period equity capital 21 , E t FK t+1 to total assets at time t, AS t , of ? percents. Note that FK t is a state and predetermined variable at period t and depends merely on previous period 20 Technically CB in many countries extend secured loans to commercial banks through reverse repurchase agreement operations. Such operations are the major day-to-day monetary policy instrument. 21 Note that in period t, the financial intermediary has no control over the existing stock of financial capital, FK t , and thus we enter the end-of-period FK t+1 into the capital constraint of time t.
action. Therefore, any change in capital requirements refers to and financial stability goals, banks must comply with the CB imposed nominal reserve requirement at a rate of rr t (see below). We assume that this constraint is binding at all times, i.e. total reserves equal the required reserves, RR t = rrD t where D t is the total deposits at the bank.
The resource constraint (balance sheet) of the commercial bank before the realization of the uncertainty is
When the systemic risk is realized and the banks become insolvent, the CB activates the deposit insurance where it pays off depositors through the commercial banks such that for each bank the following condition is satisfied:
is the realization of the true λ . Note that when systemic risk is realized, the total (period t) financial capital of the commercial bank is completely depleted.
Following a period in which commercial banks become insolvent, the y continue on to the next period operating as new financial intermediaries 22 .
The conditional expected period t+1 profit when the realization of the systemic risk has not occurred (with probability 1-q t+1 ) is given by
Similarly, the conditional expected period t+1 profit/loss when the realization of the systemic risk does occur (with probability q t+1 ) and the bank becomes insolvent is given by (5b) is part of the obligations of the CB to depositors when deposit insurance arrangement is activated.
The state unconditional expected period t+1 profit is then given by
We assume for simplicity that the commercial banks' shareholders seek to maximize their period t+1 expected dividends payment which they receive in all states of nature in which the y have positive profits. Accordingly, in each period t the commercial bank maximizes the expected dividends payment, d t E t ? t , where the expected profit is defined in (5c), and is subjected to the following constraints (5d-(5h) 24 The maximum leverage constraint, which is set by the bank's management and is given by
23 We assume here that even when there is a realization of systemic risk and the deposit insurance has been activated, still due to the "haircut" of the depositor return the commercial bank may realizes positive profits which are then distributed to the shareholders. because of (2b) and constraint (5d).
The minimum capital requirement is applied to FK t+1 of period t+1 relative to the total loans L t . and is given by
The limit on the amount a financial intermediary can borrow from the CB in the form of monetary loans. The collateral constraint is (5f)
We assume that the CB has priority over the commercial bank assets in time of insolvency.
For simplicity we require a strict equality in the following reserve requirement constraint, (i.e. banks do not hold excess reserves) (5g)
Finally, banks accumulate financial capital according to the following dynamic process: 25 A cycle in which following a growth of the economy borrowers demand for loans increases, the banks exposure to credit risk increase both due to the expansion of the loans but also because of the assumed increase of the credit risk itself. Consequently, the probability of systemic crisis increases in time of rapid growth. 26 One could perceive the rate of t to be less restrictive (higher) the greater is the proportion of deposits insured by the CB, but for simplicity we leave it independent.
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where the second term on the RHS of (5h) is the total period t loans written off and the last term is the retained earnings.
Thus the financial intermediary in period t chooses i Lt , l mt , FK t+1 , and d t to maximize its expected dividends payment subject to (4a), (5d)-(5h). Since all commercial banks are assumed to be identical we will refer in the analysis to a representative bank.
c. Central bank
The CB pursues two goals: reduc ing the deviations of the inflation from its target, and maintaining financial stability, which in our setup means controlling q t+1 and maintaining enough resources, SR, to meet the deposit insurance obligations. The target inflation rate is determined exogenously. Inflation can deviate from its target due to shocks and to bring it back on target, the CB adjusts its KPR i mt . The CB sets a perfectly elastic supply of monetary loans at the KPR, with the required provision of collateral.
To safeguard financial stability the CB can resort to the following: (i) Limits credit expansion by imposing a minimum capital adequacy ratio. The capital ratio requirement aims at containing the exposure of commercial banks to credit risk and serving as a cushion to absorb losses. (ii) Provides a safety net in the form of partial deposits insurance, when the commercial banks fail. The CB guarantees a share ?,
, of each household 's deposit at the commercial banks 27 , where ? is predetermined 28 .
(iii) In addition, the CB imposes a reserve requirements constraint, rr, which is important in our setting for both the effective control of the monetary interest rate, as well as for enhancing financial stability.
Since the reserves held by the commercial banks are the only eligible collateral for CB loans in our model, they in effect create a sustained demand for the CB monetary loan, thus ensuring that the CB has effective control over the policy interest rate. Furthermore, this collateral arrangement enables the CB to expand or contract the supply of liquidity to the banks as needed. We note that this arrangement increases the potential outstand ing commercial banking loans to individuals from a maximum amount of L t =(1-rr t )D t +FK t, when monetary loans are not available, to a maximum of L t =D t +FK t . when the full amount of the monetary loan is extended.
The CB accumulates seigniorage revenue (SR) in our model from the banks' reserves rrD t , and the outstanding balances of the monetary loans, l mt on which it charge a positive interest rate. The accumulated SR at the CB, given that last period the deposit insurance has not been activated, is
The CB net worth is increased by the flow of Given an expected inflation rate, this structure provides (if ?<1) certainty dominance to holding cash over banks' deposits. Of course it may also give rise to an interest rate differential between the two financial assets. 28 The choice of ? could reflect two opposing forces which are at the back round of the model. A higher ? enhances financial stability by reducing the correlation of shocks to deposits and a systemic shock, while at the same time it enhances risk taking by the commercial banks (moral hazard).
d. Market Clearing
In conducting its monetary policy operations, the CB supplies just enough monetary loan balances to meet the commercial banks demand at the predetermined KPR.
Commercial banks accept all deposits supplied by the individuals at the market deposit rate i dt , where the latter is determined in accordance with the KPR. On the other hand, commercial banks ha ve market power in the loan market, thus given the investor demand for loans and the deposit interest rate, they set the loan rate i Lt at a level that satisfies the investors' demand for loans as well as maximizes their expected profits (see Figure 1) . D = L -FK t is the commercial bank's resource constraint and point A (in Figure 1) is the pair (L m , i m ) that equilibrates the monetary loan market. 
e. Information Setup and Equilibrium Conditions
Households in our economy make decisions when they are young (at period t) for both periods t and t+1 choices. These decisions are based on the information available at period t. This set of information includes all perceived probabilities but not the actual realizations. In equilibrium the perceived probability of commercial bank failure q t+1 by individuals should be consistent with the fundamentals and the perceived λ since they determine the conditions under which the commercial banks go bankrupt. Hence it must satisfy the following
where H is the cumulative probability distribution of the default on loans granted by the bank a period ago 30 . The term in the curly brackets is the state in which the banks' equity capital is negative.
Substituting the resource constraint (4a) and the conditional expected profit when the systemic risk has not yet occurred (5a) into (8) yields the following
The expression within the curly brackets is easier to understand, it indicates the state in which the beginning of period level of equity capital in addition to the conditional next period's expected profit are just not enough to cover the expected loan losses.
Clearly the function H is a monotonic function with 0 < ′ H . Since FK t is predetermined in period t, q t+1 is determined by the conditional expected next period profits of banks and the expected loan defaults. A larger q t+1 means less financial stability.
In order to fulfill its deposit insurance obligation, the CB needs to generate sufficient SR and/or to restrain commercial banks' exposure to credit risk. Since the CB is aware of systemic risk (through equation (2a)) and takes it into considerations in determining its policy parameters, the following incentive compatible constraint is satisfied. 
The expression
is the nominal value of the commercial bank's total assets, expected to be realized in period t+1, while
is the nominal value of its total liabilities (to the individuals and the CB), expected to be realized in period t+1. When the latter exceeds the former the addition to the commercial bank equity capital is negative.
That is, the SR accumulated up to period t should be no less than the sum (over all banks) of the absolute values of banks' net worth in states where systemic risk is realized, evaluated by the true λ (k t ).
Equilibrium characteristics a. Households
We begin with the first order conditions characterizing the various individuals in our economy. Let ct v denote the marginal utility with respect to c t . Given that investors take the probability ? as given, the condition characterizing their choice is
where f k is the marginal productivity of capital. The marginal rate of substitution in consumption equals the expected marginal productivity of capital. We further get for the investors that (10b)
i.e. the expected real interest rate on loans equals the expected marginal productivity of capital.
Since there is a positive probability for realizing zero net return on the physical investment, investors may hold money balances for precautionary motives 31 .
So from the FOC with respect to the money balances we get that if ind eed money balances are held we have 
b. Financial Intermediaries
In this section we derive the conditions characterizing the representative financial intermediary choices. We begin by the elimination of AS t and D t in (5c) utilizing the resource constraint (4a). We then use constraints (5d)-(5h) to set the Lagrangian for the representative bank as follows Note that both (5e) and (5h) restrict E t FK t+1 and they are in fact linear in it, so in the case where they are both binding we have that 
Next we derive from the FOC corresponding to the commercial bank's choice of i Lt , the relationship between the loan interest rate and the deposit interest rate, obtaining
is the interest rate elasticity of the demand for loans.
Finally w e combine (13c) and (13d) to eliminate (1-(1-?)q t+1 ) and have the transmission mechanism from the CB i mt to the market i Lt of the following
One of the hypothesis of the paper is that monetary policy is interconnected with financial stability. It indeed turns out that the pass-through from the i mt to i dt depends, not only on whether constraint (5f) is binding or not (i.e. f 3 >0 or not), but also on the extent to which the required reserves ratio and capital ratio are used as 33 The financial capital accumulation (5h) is always binding, while the minimum capital ratio (5e) may not be binding, in which case banks hold financial capital in excess of the required amount.
policy instruments (see (13c) and (13d)). If, for example, in time of a trough where deflationary pressures emerge, the CB implements an expansionary monetary policy (by reducing i mt ) and simultaneously raises the minimum capital requirement ratio ?
for financial stability purposes, the combined effects on i dt and iLt could offset each other (13c and 13e). This case demonstrates clearly a possible conflict between the two CB goals of attaining the inflation target and safeguarding financial stability 34 .
We define the effectiveness of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy as the partial derivative From equations (13c)-13(e) it is apparent that the effectiveness of monetary policy is affected by financial stability tools, rr, ? and ?, by the leverage constraint (5d) as well as by the collateral constraint imposed on the use of monetary loans (5f).
Also we get from this transmission mechanism that when the CB interest rate or the deposit rate reach the zero bound, the CB can affect i Lt by adjusting the reserve ratio or/and the capital requirements, as well as by loosening the collateral constraint on the monetary loans, (reflected in f 3 ). In this situation, if a reduction in the lending rate is warranted to offset say a deflationary shock, then the viable monetary policy tools are ones which in normal circumstances are financial stability instruments. This clearly 34 Regarding the pass-through from the policy rate to the market rates, we note from (13d ) that if the risk management relaxes its constraint on the leverage (increases t), then t 1 ϕ will decreases and the interest rate on loans will be (ceteris paribus) lowered, given the CB rate, i mt . 35 Note in this regard (13c and 13d) that monetary policy becomes particularly effective when there is full deposit insurance (?=1). But this in turn may, ceteris paribus, expose the banking system to more systemic risk, as the commercial bank's willingness to expand loans increases. This example reflects a trade-off between monetary policy effectiveness and systemic risk.
demonstrates how inextricably interlocked are the tools of monetary policy and financial stability 36 .
b2. Commercial ba nks use monetary loans up to their collateral constraints
Let the expected real dividends paid out by the banks to the representative old consumer be denoted by
and without loss of generality we assume I=1 (there is one representative commercial bank). Note that we can combine the expression for the expected profits (5c) and the resource constraint for the bank (4a) to get the following expression for the expected dividends payment where the optimal d t is chosen to have constraint (5h) satisfied with equality. There are two expressions in the RHS of (14) that appear in squared brackets. The first one can be analyzed using equilibrium condition (13d) and the second one can be analyzed using condition (13c). For now we deal only with the latter, that is, substituting from (13c) into (14) to yield 
Semi-Log linear consumer's preferences
In order to analytically trace better some of the equilibrium characteristics in our model economy, we utilize the case where the consumers' preferences are semi-log linear, that is, take the form And from (10d) we get
Note that these money demands of both types depend on the expected nominal interest rates (see the definitions of R dt and R Lt ) and not directly on the inflation. Furthermore, the demand for the real money balances of individuals of type 1 (the depositors) is positive iff the expected gross return on deposit 1 ) 1 )( ) 1 ( 1 (
. And the individuals of type 2 demand for real money balances is positive iff the expected gross interest rate on loan 1 ) 1 ( < + Lt i λ .
Next we utilize (3a) and (11a) to get the individual's supply of bank deposits
where the money demand in (16c) is solved by (16a).
Next we solve for the investor's demand for the capital stock, we get from the definitions of the functions f(k t ) and (10b) 
We can now use (3b), (10a) and (10b) 
Interaction of monetary policy and financial stability
In this section we derive explicitly the interaction between monetary policy and financial stability policy in achieving the CB goals. To that end we examine two shocks: first, a negative shock to the return on the physical investment, which is translated in our model to a shock to inflation, to which the CB reacts by adjusting the KPR while overlooking the effects on financial stability. Second, a negative shock to ?(k t ) which is interpreted as a shock to financial stability to which the CB reacts by adjusting the capital requirement ?, while overlooking the effects on inflation.
We conduct two complemented types of analyses: an analytical one and one in which we simulate our model economy. In the former we use the solutions described in equations (16) and the first-order conditions to analytically study the effects of the aforementioned shocks on our economy. In the latter we simulated our model, and use it to derive the effects of the shocks on the economy. We turn to the simulations since there are non-linearities in the model and thereby the analytical analysis is often impossible to implement or produces ambiguous results. The simulations enable us to identify the conditions under which certain desirable effects exist.
6.a. Effects of the aforementioned shocks on inflation and aggregate risk absence the CB reaction
For these effects we simulate our model economy. For the sake of tractability, and without loss of generality we look for an equilibrium in the simulations where only individuals of type 1 (the depositors) hold real money balances while type 2 (the investors) do not.
The values of the parameters and the state variables we use in the simulations are presented in Table 1 . The KPR i m is chosen to have the inflation rate be on target.
In the range of values specified in Table 1 Namely, for this condition to be satisfied, the interest rate elasticity of the demand for k t needs be relatively large. We note that condition (17) can also be expressed in terms of the elasticity of the real investment with respect to the real interest rate on loans in which case condition (17) (2)) hit the economy in period t. It can be verified from (11c) that this shock may affect the expected inflation. Therefore in reaction, the CB adjusts its KPR in order to maintain the inflation expectations at its target.
We can derive analytically the conditions under which, in the absence of monetary policy reaction, a negative shock to A lowers expected inflation and pushes downward the demand for k t thus yielding a lower i Lt . However, for our purpose it is sufficient to have these results materialized in the simulations following the shock as indeed they do (see Figure 1 and Table 2 ).
Following the fall in the inflation expectations and assuming condition (17) holds, the CB lowers its KPR in order to achieve the inflation target. The effectiveness of the monetary policy is derived by comparing the equilibrium following the CB reaction relative to an equilibrium that would have been realized in the absence of policy reaction. The next result refers to this latter comparison.
Result 4. Following the negative shock to the return on the physical investment, which drives the inflation below its target, the CB lowers its i mt to bring back inflation to its
37 With the real interest rate on loans of 5% and a=0.32 we have that the elasticity of the demand for k t with respect to the real rate should be greater than 0.07 which is consistent with empirical findings. 38 Persistence in our model environment means during the whole period when the individual is young. It should be noted that these results are sensitive to the range of values (Table   1) we used in the simulations. However, for our purpose it is enough to show an example in our model that produces the trade-off between price stability and financial stability goals. Indeed we get that once the monetary authority takes measures to achieve the inflation target, it may worsen the financial stability stance as indeed is reflected in the higher q t+1 and the lower SR t (see table 2).
6.c. A negative shock to ?(k t )
In this section we examine the effects of a negative shock to ?(k t ) (a decrease in the parameter ? in the definition of ?(k t )) which is interpreted as a shock to credit risk. We further assume that the individuals in the economy are not aware of the reduction in ?(k t ), that is, the perceived ? remains unchanged. However, the CB identify the rise in the credit risk and thus responds by raising the capital requirements, ?, to fully offset the decrease in ?(k t ). (Recall that the CB knows the true relationship ?(k t )). The following results summarize the effects of the shock and the CB reaction to it.
Result 6. Assume that constraint (5d) is not binding and there is a negative shock to
? (k t Note that in this case the financial stability policy is successful in enhancing the financial stability stance after the hit of the negative shock, as is reflected in the improvement in both financial stability indicators.
The risk-management (leverage) constraint and the monetary policy transmission mechanism
Finally we examine the effect of the risk-management constraint (5d) on the effectiveness of the monetary policy in bringing the inflation back to its pre-shock level. For that we change the endowment of type 2 individuals such that constraint (5d) is binding. Assume further that K min is adjusted too so that the individuals (the investors) can get loans to finance the investment in the real channel. 
Concluding Remarks
We develop in the paper an overlapping-generation monetary model in which there exists interrelations and reciprocity between the implementation of monetary policy to achieve inflation target and of macro-prudential policy to maintain and safeguard financial stability. Policy considerations that are relevant for one policy appear to have impact and to influence the considerations of the other to the extent that coordination is needed to avoid (possibly) substantial loss in one of the policy goals.
